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23efollowing essay is the pre-editing drrrfr 
of the introduction to a paper delivered at a 
Mass Torts conference held at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School in November 1999. 
Thc conftrence grtw out of the work of the 
ad hoc Mass Torts Working Group that on 
February 15,1999, delivered a Report to the 
ChiefJustice of the United States and the 
judicial Conference of the United States. The 
Working Group, chaired by Third Circuit Judge 
Anthony J. Scirica, '65, included members 
drawn from several Judicial Conference 
committees, including the Advisory Committee 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
from theJudicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation. The Working Group held four public 
t is the way of symposia that 
conveners assign topics that participants 
use as an excuse to explore topics that 
interest the participants. I understand my 
assignment to be discussion of "non- 
bankruptcy closure" and "settlement." The 
work of the Judicial Conference Workmg 
Group on Mass Torts suggests approaches 
that might be taken to facilitate closure of 
meetings that in all were attended by 81 mass tort claims by litigation or by 
lawyers, judges, Md tzcdmics. The models settlement. Much of h paper will explore 
that are d i ~ w s e d  in the body of the P V  were two models prepared to illustrate the 
prepared to stimulate discussion at these challenges that confront any approach to 
meetings and were set out in the Report these goals. The first model is the "All 
appendices. 
Little need be said about the models 
themselves. They do not purport to resolve the 
dilemmas sketched in the introduction. To the 
contrary, they are designed to underscore the 
intransigence .of the problems that arise from 
efloorts to resolve substantial personal injury or 
extensive property damage by a mbstantially 
common course ofcor~d~ct .  Asbestos and 
silicone gel breast implants provide the most 
familiar models, but there have been m y  
~ n c o i ~ a s s i n ~  ~bdel," while the second is 
a draft of settlement-class provisions for 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Before 
exploring the models, however, they 
provide an exam for considering many of 
the reasons for doubt provoked by 
reflecting on the Working Group's 
experience. These are equal-opportunity 
doubts. There are powerful reasons to 
doubt the virtues of individual litigation of 
others and are likely to be many more. Ll indvidual claims that arise out of a mass Thfut l  d c "  'Wean at '4' Un'vmiV tort. ~h~ reasons Npport exploration of 
of Pennsylvania taw Review (June 2000) as 
*Agmegation and S&loMtt o f  Mas Tom. " maSs aggre@tion and - - - At 
CTO u 
The following excerpt appearihere with the the - - .  same time, there powetful 
1 nen;lissia o'j ~ ; l ~ ~ & ~ ~ ~  of PeansvlMnia to doubt the virtues of mass aggregation 
Lw ~ e v i e k  Cmplete c G e s  ofthe a;ticie are and mass setthent. These reasons 
available from Law Q u a h g l e  Notes, the support the argument for making only 
author, via Lwis or Westlaw, orfrom the modest changes or none at all. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review In the end, there d l  be no firm 
writing: D~boruh Showell, D ! c e  M a a ~  conclusion. Indeed, not even the doubts 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, will be expressed in firm or fully developed 
3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, terms. The issues go to the core of 
Pennsylvania 1 91 04. adversary civil litigation. They go also to 
the core of tort doctrine for nonintentional 
wrongs, the multifarious character of state 
tort law as applied to conduct and injuries 
that span the nation, the role of federal 
courts in choosing and applying state law, 
the practices of representation that have 
substituted for individualized litigation, 
and more. Our received traditions in all of 
these areas are treasured, and properly so, 
but none of them fares well when 
subjected to the test of mass-tort litigation. 
only drastic remedes will bring much 
change. Even those who are prepared to 
accept drastic changes that hold stmng 
promise of great benefit may draw back 
from predicting the benefits that would 
justify the costs. We may be better a d y d  
to pursue small changes, anticipating only 
small benefits. All that is offered here is 
support for the argument that the changes 
that might achieve true coherence are 
indeed drastic. In some measure, these 
doubts carry over even to the modest goal 
of facilitating the hope for global peace 
through settlement by revising Civll Rule 
23 to address the problems that thwarted 
two brave attempts to establish massive 
asbestos settlements. 
There is a particular reason for setting a 
high threshold of justification for changes 
by statute or court rule. Both with and 
without resort to Civil Rule 23, state and 
federal courts - prodded by lawyers for 
plaintiffs and defendants - have proved 
remarkably inventive in addressing the 
demands of mass torts. Stratagems 
accepted as routine today would have been 
dismissed as unthinkable a scant decade 
ago: Although there are foundations in 
court rules and statutes, the process has 
been very much a common-law process. 
Often it is observed that each new mass 
tort presents different problems, requiring 
different procedural solutions, than any of 
its prede~essors. If that is so, it may be 
better to leave the judges on the firing lines 
free to adapt to the new challenges without 
interference from statutes and rules framed 
for the last war by the generals in Congress 
and the tacticians in the rulesmaking 
committees. There is a risk that lower 
courts, confronted with overwhelming 
burdens, may act from expediency rather 
than principle. But there is a hope that new 
principles will emerge from their inventive 
adaptations. 
One last prefatory caution is in order. In 
talking about mass torts, it may seem 
desirable to offer a definition of the subject. 
One of the two words, "tort," is easy The 
discussion does not involve everything 
withn a broad concept of tort law. We are 
tallang about injuries at the center of 
traditional tort doctrine: personal injury, 
and substantial injury to physical property, 
real or personal. The wrongs defined by 
modem regulatory legslation - antitrust, 
securities, and the like - seem different. 
And even with personal injury, we are 
seldom dealing with wrongs that are 
intentional in any but a very refined sense. 
The second word, "mass," is not so easy. It 
would be possible to pick a numerical 
thrtsholq, and that may be desirable for 
reform kgislation. The number is likely to 
be rather high. Two hundred fifty actions 
arising from common facts, or one 
thousand, may be handled by the collective 
resources of state and federal courts 
without significant disruption. The choice 
of a number, however, must be affected by 
something more than the impact on the 
judicial system. It also must take account 
of the impact on the tort claims. The more 
drastic the consequences that flow from a 
mass-tort characterization, the greater the 
care needed in framing the definition. The 
broad model described below would have 
drastic consequences indeed, affecting 
choice of forum, choice of law, aggregated 
disposition, and more. Large numbers 
should be required for this sort of 
approach. Even for aggregated settlement, 
many models entail similar consequences 
in gentler guise. Again, care is warranted. 
WE ASK k GREAT DEAL OF TORT THIXllfW 
AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN TORT 
LITIGATION. ONE TEST OF AGGREGATING 
DEVICES IS TO ASK WHETHER, IF WE HAD 
JUDICIAL RESOURCES FOR THE TASK, IT 
WOULD BE BElTER TO ENABLE EVERY 
PLAINTIFF WHO WISHES TO SUE ALONE TO 
DO SO, AND - IN THE TRADITIONAL 
MODEL - TO SUE AS MANY TIMES A5 
THERE ARE DEFENDANTS TO SUE. MANY 
ARGUMENTS ARE MADE IN FAVOR OF THIS 
RESULT. THE FORCE OF THESE ARGUMENTS 
IS AUGMENTED BY THE WEIGHT OF 
TRADITION. BRIEF REMINDERS OF THE 
TRADITION SUFFICE TO SET THE SCENE. 
- d' r 
1 i 
A. Individual Adjudication of 
Tort Claims 
We ask a great deal of tort theory and 
judicial institutions in tort litigation. One 
test of aggregating devices is to ask 
whether, if we had judicial resources for 
the task, it would be better to enable every 
plaintiff who wishes to sue alone to do so, 
and - in the traditional model - to sue 
as many times as there are defendants to 
sue. Many arguments are made in favor of 
this result. The force of these arguments is 
augmented by the weight of tradition. Brief I 
reminders of the tradition suffice to set the 
scene. 
Traditionally, the plaintiff begins by 
choosing a court. The rules of subject- 
matter jurisdiction, coupled with the reality 
that most of the central defendants in mass 
torts are corporations, often give a choice 
between state and federal courts. Adept 
framing of the litigation can lock the case 
into state court. As between state courts, 
contemporary views of personal 
jurisdiction and venue often give a 
substantial range of choice as well. This 
choice can be exercised to tactical 
advantage by considering such matters as 
local aggregation practices (including 
settlement), jury proclivities and the degree 
of judicial control, choice-of-law rules, 
docket congestion, and attorney 
QUITE A DIFFERENT 
CHALLENGE TO THE 
INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION 
MODEL ASKS WHETHER 
THERE IS ANY REALITY TO 
THE IMAGE OF INDIVIDUAL 
REPRESENTATION. THERE ARE, 
TO BE SURE, SOME 
AJTORNEYS AND FIRMS 
WHO LIMIT THEIR 
INVOLVEMENT IN MASS 
TORT LITIGATION TO 
REPRESENTATION OF A 
SMALL NUMBER OF CLIENTS, 
TREATING EACH CASE IN 
MUCH THE SAME WAY AS 
THE SAME NUMBER OF 
UNRELATED CASES WOULD 
BE TREATED. 
convenience. Often, putting aside 
constraining class-action practices, the 
individual plaintiff chooses as well when to 
bring suit, whom to associate as co- 
plaintiffs, and whom to make defendants. 
Individual plaintiffs also can make choices 
whether to push for prompt disposition 
and early relief, whether to emphasize 
liability or damages, how to pursue 
discovery, and - often above all - what 
terns to accept in settlement. 
Apart from the effect of these many and 
elusive choices on outcome, we celebrate 
the "process values" that go with individual 
control. The sense of participation and 
control are believed to affect the level of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with litigation, 
and the acceptability of the process. We 
tend to focus on plaintiffs in praising these 
values, perhaps in part because we - 
some of us, at any rate - do not care as 
much about the process-value experience 
of corporate defendants, and perhaps in 
part because we believe that defendants 
who face many adversaries can achieve a 
substantial measure of participation and 
control in aggregated litigation in ways that 
individual plaintiffs do not. 
Frank discussion of the charms of 
individual litigation adds values that 
represent escape from the cold rationality 
of legal rules. As to most issues in mass 
torts, the burden of persuasion is stated as 
a preponderance of the evidence. The 
preponderance of the evidence, however, is 
an extraordinarily fluid concept that is 
shaped by many subtle factors. The context 
of specific parties and injuries may have a 
powerful impact on the willingness of 
either judge or jury to accept a given level 
of uncertainty This flexible response to fact 
uncertainty joins with equally flexible 
response to legal uncertainty Fault, 
contributory fault, causation, as well as the 
fancier frills that may decorate tort theory, 
all bend to individual factors. Such 
adaptability seems to some to speak ill of 
the institutions that administer our law, but 
to many it represents a triumph of justice 
over law. 
This summary recital of the advantages 
of individual litigation would read to many 
observers as a recital of disadvantages. To 
take one narrow illustration, defendants 
bewail the opportunities plaintiffs often 
enjoy to select a court, just as plaintiffs 
decry the occasional opportunities that 
defendants seize to defeat a plaintws initial 
choice. When dealing with individuahzed 
events that involve no more than a few 
people, nonetheless, these protests have 
not led to any general change or prospect 
of change. 
 isa at is faction with individual adversary 
litigation of tort claims takes on a new tone 
when addressed to mass torts. With 
esscnually unique events, we have few 
ways to measure the conectness of the 
judgment. It is relatively easy to take it on 
faith that most judgments are wise. Mass 
torts, however, support frequent repetition 
of the litigation experiment. Frequent 
repetition invites inconsistent results, both 
on the merits and in measuring damages. 
The inconsistencies, moreover, are 
confused by the efforts of both plaintiffs 
and defendants to manipulate the results 
by jockeying to bring to trial the cases that 
seem most favorable as measured by fact, 
sympathy, law, and tribunal. The 
inconsistency and manipulability of results 
leads to regular debates about "maturity" 
It is regularly suggested that a mass tort 
becomes mature only through a substantial 
number of individual trials. When the 
results begin to converge, maturity is 
reached and values are established. Until 
then, the fear is that a single adjudication 
cannot reliably resolve all claims. The value 
of repose justifies acceptance of the first fair 
trial of an individual claim, but not of 
many claims. 
Quite a different challenge to the 
individual representation model asks 
whether there is any reality to the image of 
individual representation. There are, to be 
sure, some attorneys and firms who limit 
I their involvement in mass tort litigation to 
I representation of a small number of clients, 
treating each case in much the same way as 
the same number of unrelated cases would 
be treated. Many plaintiffs, however, come 
to be represented by a small number of 
, speciahzed firms that represent enormous 
"inventories" of clients. This broad-scale 
common representation is seen as another 
form of aggregation, and a form 'that 
operates free of the procedural safeguards 
1 1  t h t  surround formal aggregation. In this 
view, aggregation is a fact and 
I individualized representation for 
i individualized litigation is largely a myth. 
1 The only meaningful questions go to the 
I forms of aggregation. 
These doubts about the institutional and 
procedural capacities of courts commingle 
,!: with doubts about our abstract tort 
I, 
theories. In part the doubt is whether our 
institutions and procedure are able to 
administer our abstract tort theories, either 
in individualized torts or in mass torts. The 
adrmnistration problems in mass torts, 
however, also raise substantive questions 
about the theories themselves. 
One of the institutional doubts peculiar 
to mass torts is the frequently expressed 
fear that "premature" aggregation wdl 
create a mass tort where more sober 
procedures would show there is none. One 
version of t h ~ ~  fear is that a few plaintiff 
victories in unusually sympathetic cases 
brought in particularly favorable forums 
wdl stampede many claimants into 
premature filings, intimidate courts into 
aggregation, and force capitulation. A more 
sensible process of repeated trials of typical 
cases might reveal that there is no mass of 
victims. 
Mass torts do not seem to have much 
effect on the substantive doubts about the 
tort theories that define liability-creating 
conduct. Negligence, product-liabfiw 
environment contamination, and like 
theories are challenged and defended on 
essentially the same grounds. New point is 
given, however, to the rules that focus on 
victims. The point often is made in 
addressing the "predominance" 
requirement for certifying a class under 
Civil Rule 23(b)(3). Questions of causation, 
plaintiff fault, and damages are treated as 
unique to each plaintiff, and to 
predominate over common issues of the 
defendant's responsibility But we are driven 
to ask whether these distinctions really 
should be made, at least when common 
injuries are inflicted on thousands, tens of 
thousands, or even greater numbers of 
victims. Why, for example, should the 
"make whole" view of tort law award more 
money to the victim who had enjoyed the 
fortune of making more money, and thus 
has suffered the misfortune of losing a 
greater stream of future income? How can 
we possibly presume to distinguish the 
value of the anguish, pain, suffering, and 
like intangble injuries of victims who have 
suffered the same physical impairment? 
Why should we care that, statistically, 
smokers are more likely to be injured by 
asbestos exposure than nonsmokers: if we 
cannot trace the causal connection with 
respect to a particular plaintiff, why tak 
account of the statistical probabhty - 
unless it is to support a contribution clam 
on an aggregated basis by asbestos 
defendants against tobacco manufacturers? 
As measured by these traditional notions, it 
is indeed "weird" that a settlement of 
blood-solids litigation should award 
$100,000 to each victim without 
accounting for any of these dtstinctions; a 
less tradition-bound view might see the 
result as profoundly wise. 
Substantive doubts about tort doctrine 
bear on aggregation in another way 
Different state-law systems threaten to 
destroy the commonality that supports 
aggregation, whether by class action or 
other device. If we become impatient with 
these obstacles, it is easier to subordinate 
state-law differences to achieve the 
advantages of aggregation. 
B. Aggregation I 
Aggregation has many advantages. It 
offers promise of "a single, udorrn, fair, 
and efficient resolution of all claims 
growing out of a set of events so related as 
to be a 'mass tort." At least after "maturity" 
has been achieved, there is a single 
determination for all parties. The single 
determination avoids the inconsistencies 
that arise from separate adjudications, 
achieving the uniformity - like treatment 
of like daims - that eludes'us, at @es a i  
to liabfity and inevitably as to &medies, 
when we c h g  to individual litigation. A 
once-for-all-who-remain adjudication a n  
command litigating resources and judicial 
attention in a way that may enhance the 
prospect of fair disposition. Even if the 
result is no more fair - if, indeed, wen 
uniformity generates as much unf-ess as 
fairness -- it may reduce drastically the 
costs that attend individual litigation. 
The costs of aggregation vary with the 
form. Voluntary small-scale consolidation 
by pe~nissive joinder or s& devices 
presents few problems. Aggregation by 
inventory was noted earlier. Aggregation by 
consolidation of actual cases actually filed 
may seem the next more coercive step. The 
effect of consolidation, however, is little 
different from class certification if any 
substantial number of actions is involved. 
Opt-in class aggregation offers an 
alternative that has found little support. 
of informed consent represented by a 
failure to opt out is likely to be as hgh in 
body-injury mass torts as anywhere, but 
still leaves much to be desired. But "high" 
may not always be high enough. A 
clairnant who has an attorney may not be 
given sound advice about the opt-out 
decision, and many damants - 
particularly those who have only "future" 
claims - may not have attorneys at all. An 
opt-in class, on the other hand, involves 
only those whose consent is as real as the 
consent that personal inj,ury victims give to 
much of anything in the course of litigating 
their claims. The class can be certified on 
terms that avoid many of the problems of 
an opt-out dass, including specification of 
a choice of law, methods for compensating 
both class counsel and counsel for those 
who opt in, methods for resolving 
individual issues, and so on. An opt-in 
settlement class might have particularly 
attractive advantages. The class would in 
effect involve an offer to settle extended to 
all victims after negotiation by 
representatives whose negotiation is likely 
to be respected. The central objection to 
this procedure seems to be that it would 
not work. Too few clauxxms would chmse 
to opt into a litigation class, and too few 
would chooie to accept the offer of 
settlement by intervening. The pragmatic 
view is that a settlement offer would be 
viewed as a new floor, assuredly available 
to anyone who fads to ,opt in but 
supporting more favorable terms for most. 
Even a litigation class would have the same 
effect - no one would opt ~I, expecting 
that any class victory would estab1ish a 
similar floor for later settlements. 
merits - even a defendant willing to risk 
the fuiU damages h b d ~ t y  that would follow 
a fair adjuchcation of liabihty settles for fear 
that the sheer m a s  of %If-identified 
victims will overwhelm reason and force a 
finding of liability The rewards of 
successful broad aggregation, moreover, 
encourage a race to aggregate fmt, or at 
least to bring the fint aggregated action 
to judgment. 
Class-action aggregation emphasizes the 
problem of conflicting interests among 
plaintiffs. The problem exists in any 
aggregation, but is highlighted by Rule 23 
requirements, A sea~hmg inquiry into 
potential conflicts could easily lead to so 
many subolasses as to defeat any hope of 
global settlement or a smgle trial. Conflicts 
will exist based on differences in extent 
and character of injuries, optimal choice of 
law, comparative responsibdity, causation, 
and other easily identifiable positions. 
Individual victims, given free choice, likely 
would differ as well with respect to more 
elusive choices of litigation tactics, most 
particularly including settlement. Workable 
control over a thoroughly consolidated 
proceeding is likely to be achieved only by 
resolutely ignoring many of these conflicts. 
l h s  result can be achieved by pretending 
that the confhcts do not exist, by asserting 
the advantages of efficiency and &counting 
the importance of the confhcts, or by 
forthrightly concludmg that many 
distinctions drawn by m&tional tort rules 
for indvidualized litigation do not justify 
recoption of an "interest" that defeats 
aggregation. a choice-of-law question, 
for example, it can be asserted that all 
relevant laws are essentially the same; that 
the differences are too trivial to upset 
efficient disposition; or that the differences 
do n a  justly wamnt Merent treatment - 
that like treaunent should be accorded 
victim from all states. 
A very special problem of conflicting 
interests arises from the desire to defer 
aggregation to the point at which a mass 
t m  has matured through the pretrial, trial, 
and settlement of an informative number of 
individual actions. The lawyers best 
equipped to manage the later aggregated 
litigation are those who brought the 
dispute to maturity They are the ones we 
want. But the anticipation of aggregation 
may make it dfficult to handle the 
indvidual actions without regard to, and 
distortion by, the future proceehngs. The 
steps taken to settle indvidual-client 
asbestos claims in preparation for 
settlement of a broad class clam provide a 
farmliar example. 
Repeated aggregation of different mass 
torts creates risks of a different sort. 
Depending in part on the means of 
aggregation, mass torts m y  come to be 
dominated by a mall number of 
speckked and well-heed lawyers, , 
litigating before a small number of 
specialized judges. The results may be 1 
similar to the problem of "regulatory 
capture." All participants know what to 
expect, and they expect to repeat the 
strategies that have brought resalution in 
the past. Tactics may be shaped by the 
expectation that all players will meet agam 
in future and different mass tort actions. 
Settlements in particular may reflect 
received tradltiolis and the expeetation of 
future negotiations. 
Effective aggregation, finally, presents 
severe challenges to received notions of 
federalism. The challenges are illustrat~d 
by the features of the proposed "broadL 
aggregation" model. Most courts are 
excluded from the action. Choice-of-law 
traditions are ignored. Common appeal 
control is asserted even when t$e a ,  
aggregation court invokes the assistance of 
other courts. These challenges will seem 
daunting to some, but trivial to others. 
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